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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERRELL H. ADA:JIS, State Treasurer of
Utah,
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. During the period of March 31, 1951 to August
27, 1951, five criminal actions, each with more than one
defendant, for violation of Section 46-0-237, U.C.A., 1943,
were prosecuted in Weber County, State of Utah. All
the evidence for said prosecutions was obtained by
private investigators who were employed by and paid
by Ogden City and by officers of Ogden City. At the
same time these criminal prosecutions were commenced
five civil proceedings to forfeit the personal property
used in connection with liquor nuisances were commenced on Relation of Paul Thatcher, City Attorney
of Ogden City. All said criminal and civil actions were
successfully prosecuted. Substantial sums resulted in
fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases.
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2. All the fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases
have been sent to the defendant herein and he now has
the same in his possession and control.
3. The plaintiff pursuant to Section 46-0-219 obtained certificates from the judges who presided at the
hearings on each of the criminal cases certifying that
officers of Ogden City initiated the prosecution of each
case; the evidence was obtained by and at the expense
of Ogden City, and officers of Ogden City assisted in
the successful prosecution of each of said cases and
that all fines, forfeitures or costs paid to the defendant
as a result of said prosecutions should be paid to Ogden
City. The judges further certified that all fines, forfeitures and costs received by the defendant in said cases
he paid to Ogden City.
4. The chairman of the Utah State Liquor Commission in writing approved the payment of all said fines,
forfeitures and costs to Ogden City.
5. The judges of the court in which said criminal
cases were beard before issuing the certificates mentioned in Paragraph 3 above had copies of the petition of
the plaintiff for issuance of said certificates served on
the District Attorney of the Second Judicial District and
on the Weber County Attorney and a date was set for
bearing on said petitions. No objection was made by
anyone to the issuance of said certificates.
6. In addition to obtaining all the evidence and initiating all of the cases, two of the attorneys for Ogden
City helped the County Attorney prepare the criminal
complaints and appeared as attorneys of record in and
were personally present at all of the hearings before
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the mag·istrate. All of the defendants in three of the
cases waived preliminary hearings. The defendants in
two of the cases demanded and had preliminary hearings. At both said preliminary hearings two attorneys
of Ogden City actiYely participated with the County
Attorney, they questioned witnesses, looked up the law
and did all other things that attorneys prosecuting
criminal cases do. All of the defendants were bound
over to the District Court.
7. In the District Court, the District Attorney
prepared the information in all the cases. Two of the
attorneys for Ogden City appeared in each of the cases
in the District Court. Plaintiff's officers were present
and participated in nearly all the consultations with
the defendants and their counsel regarding disposition
of the cases. The District Court work in these cases
consisted only of arraignments, pleas and consultations. Each defendant plead guilty. There were no
trials and no preparation for trials in the District
Court. The real work of the cases was in ohtaining
the evidence, preparing the complaints handling the
preliminary hearings and consulting with the defendants regarding disposition of the cases.
8. Demand has been made by plaintiff on the defendant for the remittance to it of all fines and forefeitures he has received from these five cases and the defendant refuses to make said remittance and as a result
thereof this action was brought, praying for an extraordinary writ to compel remittance to plaintiff of the
fines in question.

3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Under the express words of Section 46-0-219,

U.C.A. 1943, plaintiff is entitled to be paid the fines in
defendant's hands.
2. Opinions of the Attorney General are not controlling.
3. There has been no acquiescence by the plaintiff
in the administrative interpretation.
POINT 1. UNDER THE EXPREISS WORDS OF
SECTION 46-0-219, U.C.A. 1943, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN DEFENDANT'S HANDS.
Said section reads as follows:
'' 46-0-219. Payment Over of Fines and Forfeitures. All fines and forfeitures levied under
this act shall be paid to the state treasurer and
credited to the general fund; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in all cases where violations of this
act are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer
of any town, city or county the judge of the court
wherein such prosecution took place shall certify
to the state treasurer that such prosecution was
conductad by the officers of such town, city or
county, and the state treasurer, on the written
approval of the chairman of the commission,
shall pay to said town, city or county all amounts
collected as fines, forfeitures or costs as the
result of such prosecution.''
The words of statutes should be given their ordinary
and usual meaning. If that is done to this section, there
is no ambiguity or uncertainty except as to the meaning

4
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of "prosecuted to eonYirtion. '' In unequivienl terms
the legislature has provided that upon propt'r rPrtificate
and consent al! fines and forfeitun's levied under the
Liquor Control Aet should be returned to the town, city
or county in those rases where officers of such town,
city of county prosecute the cases.

Xo distinction is made as to the court in which the
prosecution takes place-the plain meaning must he
that the legislature meant the statute to apply to all
courts of the state, not merely as the defendant contends to city and justice of the peace courts.
The statute says "All fines and forfeitures levied
under this act'' the plain meaning must be the provisions
apply to all fines and forfeitures where levied, whether
for simple misdemeanors or indictable misdemeanors.
The defendant agrees that the statute means what it
says and applies to fines from all courts when it provides
that" all" fines shall be paid over to him. However, he
refuses to agree that it means what it says when it
provides that "all" fines growing out of local prosecutions (without restriction as to the court of origin)
shall be repaid to the local unit. In the latter case he
insists, at least by implication, that ''all'' means only
"part"-that part originating in the lower courts. And
nowhere in the opinions of the Attorney General, which
are hereafter considered, is any attempt made to justify
this inconsistency in the meaning attributed to the same
simple word. It would seem that "all" for the goose
should mean ''all' for the gander.
What was the purpose of Section 46-0-219 ~ It is
common knowledge that the enforcement of any liquor
control act is a very difficult matter. The legislature
5
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in that act sought to enlist and require the active assistance of all officers in this state be they state, county,
city or town officers. Section 46-0-248 makes it the
duty of "all city, county, precinct and state executive,
prosecuting and peace officers'' to enforce the provisions of the act and provides for other attorneys to
assist the prosecuting attorney and be counsel in the
case. Section 46-0-206 requires any district, county,
city or town attorney or peace officer or any other person
to come forward with any information they have of
violation of the act.
It is apparent that the legislature recognized the
difficulties of enforcement. Sections 46-0-248 and 460-206 make enforcement a duty of local unit. Section
46-0-219 makes it financially worthwhile. Section 46-0219 is merely another means the legislature used to encourage the active assistance of all officers in the state
to help enforce the act. It provides that in those cases
where local officers prosecute, the returns if any from
those prosecutions will go to the local governmental unit.
Thus the expenses of the local governmental unit in
prosecuting liquor control act violators will be in part
or in whole paid and in some cases may be financially
profitable. Thus the enforcement of the act will be a
lesser or no burden on the local units and they will
naturally be more enthusiastic about expending their
money and the time and efforts of their officers in liquor
control activities.
The encouragement of local enforcement has become
even more important in the overall administration of
the Liquor Control Act since the abolition of the Liquor

6
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Commission's enforcement unit. Now, unless local officers are encouraged, enforcement will be routine and
perfunctory In most localities, and the purpose of the
law will be defeated.
The legislature makes the controlling factors in the
matter of remittance of the fines and forfeitures (1)
prosecution to a conviction: by the officers of a town,
city or county; (2) certification of that fact to the state
treasurer by the judge of the court wherein such prosecution took place; (3) written approval by chairmen
of the Liquor CommiS<sion of the remittance to the town,
city or county of said fines and forfeitures. There arle'
no other factors or conditions attached by the legislature.
The restriction as to court of origin is a contribution
from attorney general's opinions with no basis whatever in this or any other statute.
In his answer the defendant admits that conditions
2 and 3 have been compiled with but denies that condition
1 has been met. Did officers of Ogden City prosecute
to conviction in the five criminal ca·ses here involved
within the meaning of Section 46-0-219 ~
In the ordinary indictable misdemeanor case a person with knowledge of "t~e facts presents them to the
county attorney. The county attorney issues a complaint
and handles proceedings before the magistrate to have
the defendant bound over to the district court. The
district attorney prepares the Information and handles
the matter in the district court.
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In the ordinary simple misdemeanor case under a
state statute a person with knowledge of the facts presents them to the county attorney and the county attorney tries the case.
It must be assumed that the legislature was aware
of the method for handling these matters when it enacted the Liquor Control Act. Undoubtedly the legislature did not intend to upset this orderly procedure
and it intended that offenses under that act should be
handled the same way as far as possible. By Sections
46-0-206, 46-0-219, 46-0-248 and other provisions the
legislature made it the duty of all officers to assist
in enforcement and provided for other attorneys to
assist the county and district attorneys.
If the legislature intended that ''prosecute to conviction'' in Section 46-0-219 meant that the officers of
a city or town had to issue the complaint and exclusively and without the aid or cooperation of the County
or District Attorney handle the case before the magistrate and in the district court, then as a practical
matter and as a legal proposition Section 46-0-219 is
a nullity a.s far as city and towns are concerned. The
orderly administration of justice requires that so long
as county and district attorneys are competent, honest
and actively carrying out the duties of their office
that all state complaints be issued by and with the cooperation of the county attorney and all district court
criminal matters be under the supervision and control of the district attorney. So if the legislature
meant ''prosecute to conviction'' to mean exclusive
initiation, control and trial by town or city officers,
as a practical matter, the ·statute 46-0-219 was a use-

S
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less enactment because city and town officers cannot,
will not and should not undertake such proceedings
on their own. The legislature must have intended "prosecute to conviction'' to mean to do those acts necessary
to convict and to do them within the orderly established
channels for the administration of justice, that is present the evidence to the County Attorney and have
complaints issued; obtain the evidence; assist the County
Attorney at the arraignment and preliminary hearing
before the magistrate and conduct said hearing if the
county attorney desires; to conduct the trial in the
district court or assist the district attorney herein.
Officers of Ogden City did everything in each of the five
cases here involved that could be done without ignoring
the orderly channels for the administration of justice
and without totally disregarding the county and the
district attorneys. If it had not been for action taken by
the officers of Ogden City, there would not have been
any cases and there would not have been any convict- ·
ions and no fines or forfeitures would have been realized.

It is to be observed in this connection that the legisltature, in providing for repayment of the fines, referred to the ''officers'' of the local governmental unit.
It did not refer to "prosecuting attorneys", although
attorneys are specifically mentioned in other sections.
It would seem clear from this choice of words that the
legislature intended a broad interpretation of the word
"prosecuted", because in the narrow sense of that
word, a prosecution can be conducted before a court
only by an attorney.

9
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It is equally clear, we submit, that where local
officers ''made'' the case, and a conviction resulted,
the legislature intended those officers' local units to
have the benefit of the fines. Any other interpretation defeats the obvious purpose of the law and renders many of its provisions meaningless. The legislature wanted liquor ''control'' for the state -- not fines
which were clearly regarded as a means to that end.'
See Section 46-0-44, U. S. C., 1943.
The legislature provided in 46-0-219 that the judge
of the court in which the case was held should certify
who or what officers prosecuted the case. In each of
the five cases here involved, judges presiding, the
county attorney and the district attorney recognized
that Ogden City officers were responsible for all said
prosecutions. No objection of any kind was made to
the issuance of ,said certificates and the judges who
knew the whole circumstances made the certificates.
The plaintiff submit that the actions of its officers
in each of the five cases here involved constitute "prosecuted to conviction'' as those words are used in Section 46-0-219; that the section applies to all fines and
forfeitures levied under the Liquor Control Act, regardless of the court in which levied; and that there is a
clear and present statutory duty resting on the treasurer to remit the fines to the plaintiff.
POINT 2. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
GEINERAL ARE NOT CONTROLLING.

10
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The answer of the defendant provides the opinions
of the then attorney general of 1T tah and gives the
same as the reason for non-payment of the fines here
involved to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff agrees that opinions of the attorney
general should be g-iYen some consideration by this
court. They, however, are by no means binding on the
court. The weight giv·en an opinion of the attorney
general should depend upon the soundness of the reasoning, the authorities relied upon, and the circumstances.
The opinion dated December 21, 1938, a copy of
which is part of defendant's answer herein, was given
in response to .'-1. request by the state auditor, in which
request the auditor sets forth the answer he wanted.
Said opinion answered the question in the manner desired. To point up the fallacy of that opinion, the last
paragraph reads, ''In my opinion it does not make any
difference who does the prosecuting if the action is
one brought under the state law and is in the district
court". The legislature, in Section 46-0-219, provided
that the teSt on remitting fines should be who did the
prosecuting. The attorney general says who did the
prosecuting makes no difference to him, that it is the
fact that the prosecution is under the state law and
is in the district court that is controlling. This opinion
is therefore right in the teeth of the legislative enactment and should have no weight whatsoever.
The opinion of April 4, 19·39, which opinion is also
part of defendant's answer, makes the test the court
in which the prosecution occured and expressly rules
out test supplied by the legislature.

11
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The April 18, 1939, op1n1on which is part of
defendant's answer maintains the test of "which court".
The last paragraph of that opinion reads:
"I do not belive it was the intention of the
Legislature to allow towns, cities or counties to
participate in the fines and forfeitures where
the prosecution was had in the district courts of
the State, since any appearing in the District
Court on behalf of such prosecutions would be
appearing on behalf of the district attorney, and
the prosecution by the said town, city or county
officer would not be that procecution as is meant
by the provision that where violators of the Act
are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer of
any town, city or county, the State Treasurer
·shall pay all amounts collected as fines, forfeitures or costs as the result of such prosecution.''
Assume that any appearance by an officer of a
city, town or county in the district court is "an appearance on behalf of the district attorney" as the opinion
says, what has that to do with the question of which
unit gets the fines~ The purpose of the statute was
to encourage local governmental units to assist in
enforcing the Liquor Control Act and to give them
the fines for successful prosecutions by their officers. Wben district court appearances are made by
city, town or county officers, they remain officers of
said local units, they are paid by said local units-not
by the state. They are officers of the local unit
whether acting in the city court or in the district court.
To say they are state officers is not only erroneous
in fact, but if it follows that their employer does not

12
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participate in the fine8 collected, the very purpose
of 46-0-219 is defeated and the local units will not be
encouraged to enforee those provisions of the Liquor
Control Act whirh must be handled in the district
courts. In the cases here concerned, regardless of the
authority with which Ogden City officers were clothed
to enable them to appear in the district court, they
remained in fact officers of Ogden City; were paid by
Ogden City and have no claim against the state for
sa1aries. If said officers in prosecuting these cases
were clothed with certain authority of district attorneys,
i. e. represent the state in indictable misdemeanor cases
in district court, what has that to do with the question
here involved~ They remained officers of Ogden City,
accountable to Ogden City, paid by Ogden City, and
except for their being officers of Ogden City, they
would not have taken any action in any of these cases.
Even if the Attorney General were right in his
opinion that "an appearance in the district court was
an appearance on behalf of the district attorney'', it
would not follow that the local unit employing the·
officer so appearing should not receive the fruits of
his efforts. The statute recognizes that the local servant is worthy of his hire, and as a matter of common
justice, the unit that employed him to do state work
should receive the benefits of that work. If city officers
at the request of the legislature perform services for
the state, the state should pay the city the promised
consideration.
Thus we see that the opinions of the Attorney
General are contrary to the purpose and express word-
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ing of the· statute. None of the opinions cite any authorities or precedents. It follows that said opinions are
entitled to no weight whatever by this court.
POINT 3. THERE HAS BEEN NO ACQUIESCENCE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION.
The defendant's interpretation of Section 46-0-219
and his and his predecessor's action in accordance therewith are not controlling in this case. In his memorandum of authorities, the defendant cites part of Section
319, Am. Jur. (50 Am. Jur. 309) on this question. Further down in the same section, the editors say:
''A contemporaneous construction is not,
however controlling; it does not preclude an
inquiry into the correctness of the construction.
It is not of such high authority as a judicial interpretation of an act. It bas even been declared
that a contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute must be resorted to with caution and reserve. In any event, to apply the
doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction to a statute, the statute so 80nstrued
must he doubtful, ambiguous, or uncertain, and
the ambiguity which arises from the language
must be so great as to compel the court to seize
upon extraneous circumstances to aid in reaching a conclusion. Where the meaning of a statute
is plain, a contemporaneous or practical construction thereof will not be permitted to control, modify, destroy, abrogate, contradict, enlarge, or restrict that meaning.''

14
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This court in two relatively recent cases considered
administratiYe interpretations. In Olsen Company v.
State Tar Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. (2d) 324,
on Page 332 of the Pacific Report, the court saiid:
''Where there is an ambiguity in the statute
as to "·hether the latter does or does not cover
a particular matter, a practical construction of
the statute shown to have been the accepted
construction of the agency charged with administering the matters in question under the statute will be one factor which the court may take
into consideration as persuasive as to the meaning of the statute. Especially is this true where
the agency, as in this case, is one on whom the
Legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute and where practi~l application of the statute presents1 the
agency with unique opportunities and experiences
for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute. But such factor is
only one among others peruasive on the court
when it is engaged in the interpretation of the
statute and may be given much or little weight
in the total consideration of the question depending on circumstances but never against the plain
meaning of the statute. . . . . ''
In Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107
Utah 24, 151 P. (2d) 467, 153 A. L. R. 1176, headnotes
of the Pacific Report (which are approved by the court
under the constitutional requirement for syUabi) read:

Headnote No. 5: ''Administrative agencies, in
executing statutory scheme, must not only determine administrative questions involved, but apply
law in first instance, that is, venture initial decision on judicial questions, but such a decision

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is neyer binding, for binding decision of law
question affecting private rights may be made
only by appropriate· court acting judicially.''
Headnote No. 7: "An administrative interpreta-

tion out of harmony with and contrary to express
provisions of statutes interpreted cannot be given
weight, as construction may not be substituted
for legislation.''
As said on Page 472 of the Pacific Report, bottom
of second column:
''To hold otherwise would permit the administrative tribunal to, in effect, amend a statute
by the adoption of erroneous interpretive regulation. Construction is not legislation and should
not be given that effect."
As to the plaintiff's acqiescence, defendant does
not allege that plaitiff acquiesced, but only that the
cities and town acquiesced. Ogden City can't be bound
by other cities. The five cases here involved are the
first cases in which Ogden City has attempted to obtain
remittance of fines assessed by a district court in a liquor
case. As f.ar as counsel for the plaintiff have been able
to learn, these are the first cases Ogden City officiers
have prosecuted in the District Court under the Liquor
Control Act, and so this is the first opportunity the
city could have had to find out the so-called administrative interpretation in such cases and its first opportunity to acquiese or object to such interpretation.
Acquiescence presupposes opportunity to speak or act
and the failure to speak or act. The plaintiff herein has
never and does not now acquiese to the state treasurer's
interpretation of the statute here concerned.

16
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~\ssuming

a city can aeqniesce in such a matter as
here concerned, the plaintiff has not done so.
A further obserYation -- eYen if thPre were a long
established, well known administratiYe interpretation
in this matter, and eYen if Ogden City had acquiesced
in the same, since the administratiYo ruling is contrary
to the express wording of the statute, the administrative
interpretation, together with acquiescense, could not
overturn the express statute and defeat the intention
of the leg-islature. If it were not so, administrative
officers could legislate merely by having the persons
concerned acquiesce in their administrative interpretations. See Utah Hotel vs. Tax Commission, supra.
CONCLUSION
Under the above discussed points, it must he concluded that the defendant has a clear and present statutory duty to remit to the plaintiff all fines and forfeitures received by him in the criminal prosecutions
described in the plaintiff's complaint. The opinions
of the attorney general and alleged acquiescence of the
plaintiff do not justify the retention of the moneys by
the defendant. The alternative extraordinary writ heretofore issued by the court in this matter should be made
permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER
CHARLES H. SNEDDON
JACK A. RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah
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